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STILL SOLVENT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT CONTINUES TO SUPPORT
“DEEPENING INSOLVENCY” AS A VIABLE TORT CLAIM IN
IN RE LEMINGTON HOME FOR THE AGED
ERIC KIM*
“A corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be presumed that
any act which extends its existence is beneficial to it.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Vince Lombardi, the wildly successful head coach of the 1960s era
Green Bay Packers, is credited with once saying that “winners never quit
and quitters never win.”2 As admirable as this old adage on perseverance
may seem, directors of insolvent corporate entities face an extremely complex situation, where choosing to liquidate—or “quitting”—may often be
the best option to maximize value for shareholders and creditors.3 Recently, however, some courts held directors tortiously liable for not dissolving a corporation soon enough.4 More specifically, under the theory of
“deepening insolvency” many jurisdictions began to hold that directors
who continue to prolong the life of an insolvent corporation can be personally liable for any damages caused as a result.5 Consequently, in juris* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law. I would like to
thank the faculty of Villanova University School of Law for their support, my
colleagues on the Villanova Law Review for their tireless efforts, and Marie and
Jinchul Kim for giving me the opportunity to attend law school.
1. See Funding Corp. of N.Y. v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y.
Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp. 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (explaining how prolonging
insolvent corporate entity’s existence may actually be harmful).
2. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1026, 1052 n.71 (2003) (discussing clichéd maxim in society that quitting is bad
and attributing “winners never quit” saying to Vince Lombardi, famous head coach
of Green Bay Packers football team).
3. See Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 BUS. LAW. 549,
551–53 (2005) (explaining nature of insolvency and discussing how keeping corporation in existence after it has continually been insolvent or unprofitable only
hurts shareholders—who are residual claimants upon liquidation—and creditors).
4. See Jay Bender, Deepening Insolvency in Alabama: Is It a Tort, a Damages Theory
or Neither of the Above?, 66 ALA. LAW. 190, 191–93 (2005) (examining deepening
insolvency’s history from 1980); Douglas R. Richmond et al., Lawyer Liability and the
Vortex of Deepening Insolvency, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 127, 131–32 (2006) (discussing
history behind deepening insolvency and tort’s origins from dicta in New York
district court case).
5. See OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (In re Oakwood
Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 530 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (discussing development
of deepening insolvency and its definition); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.),
335 B.R. 631, 636–38 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing rationale behind deepening insolvency); Limor v. Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 815
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dictions that subscribe to deepening insolvency, creditors could use the
theory to file claims against directors, officers, and anyone playing a substantial role in a business entity’s management.6
The debate on deepening insolvency has been contentious, to say the
least.7 Corporate practitioners and their clients have lamented that deepening insolvency circumvents the business judgment rule and places too
much liability on a corporation’s management.8 Many academics have
heralded the theory as an innovative addition to corporate and bankruptcy law.9 Other commentators have predicted that deepening insolvency could lead directors to liquidate a corporation too soon.10 On the
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005) (defining deepening insolvency); Kittay v. Atlantic Bank
of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Grp.), 316 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“ ‘Deepening insolvency’ refers to the ‘fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s life beyond insolvency,’ resulting in damage to the corporation caused by increased
debt.”).
6. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Wickes, Inc. v. Wilson, No.
06-0869, 2006 WL 1457786 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006) (proceeding brought by bankruptcy trustee against directors and officers of corporation); Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int’l (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(describing how bankruptcy trustee filed claims against auditors); In re Oakwood
Homes, 340 B.R. at 510 (liquidating trust files deepening insolvency claim against
principle lender of debtor); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan Ford
Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing how bankruptcy
trustee filed deepening insolvency claims against corporation’s lender and accountants); Devon Mobile Commc’ns Liquidating Trust v. Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), Bankr. No. 02–41729, 2006 WL 687153
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (liquidating trust files deepening insolvency claims
against general partner); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R.
589 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (describing how bankruptcy trustee filed deepening
insolvency claims against directors and officers of corporation); In re VarTec
Telecom, 335 B.R. at 631 (proceeding brought by unsecured creditors against secured creditors for deepening insolvency).
7. See TaeRa K. Franklin, Deepening Insolvency: What It Is and Why It Should Prevail, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 435, 437 (2006) (arguing that deepening insolvency is
good for maximizing shareholder value and should continue as part of bankruptcy
jurisprudence); Richmond et al., supra note 4, at 156 (discussing how deepening
insolvency is becoming too expansive).
8. See Daniel E. Harrell, Comment, Pandora’s Bankruptcy Tort: The Potential for
Circumvention of the Business Judgment Rule Through the Tort Theory of Deepening Insolvency, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 151, 152–54 (2006) (“A key issue concerning the deepening insolvency theory is its potential to extend to the point that it would threaten
the business judgment presumption altogether.”); Willet, supra note 3, at 560–62
(supporting recent holdings that gave directors protection from deepening insolvency claims through business judgment rule).
9. See Phillip G. Lewis, Note, “Deep” Impact: Can a Tort Theory of Deepening Insolvency Survive in the “Options Backdating” Era?, 95 KY. L.J. 919, 919 (2007) (“Despite
humble beginnings as mere dictum in a 1983 Seventh Circuit opinion, the theory
of deepening insolvency has seen a rapid expansion within the legal community,
becoming the object of much scholarly debate.” (footnote omitted)).
10. See David C. Thompson, Note, A Critique of “Deepening Insolvency,” a New
Bankruptcy Tort Theory, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 536, 546 (2007) (“Many floundering businesses are able to emerge from insolvency and provide a positive return to
shareholders while fulfilling debt obligations more completely than if they had
been forced to liquidate.”). A related concern is that having deepening insolvency
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contrary, shareholders and creditors have generally supported the theory
by arguing that it merely ensures that actions are taken to maximize corporate value.11 This disparity has extended to the courts, as the lower federal
and state courts continue to disagree on the divisive theory.12 Some have
held that deepening insolvency should be considered a form of damages
for other torts such as negligence or malpractice.13 Others have held that
deepening insolvency should be an independent tort claim.14

as a tort creates inconsistencies for directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, which may require them to try and save an insolvent corporation with
more capital (i.e., loans). See id. at 545–47 (discussing inconsistencies between
deepening insolvency and fiduciary duties).
11. See Thomas J. Vollbrecht & Theresa A. Gooley, “Deepening Insolvency”
Claims: Can You Become More Bankrupt? Can You (Or Someone Else) Sue If You Do?, 13
FIDELITY L.J. 167, 169–76 (2007) (discussing how courts started to realize that prolonging insolvent corporation’s life actually harmed corporation and
shareholders).
12. Compare Christians v. Grant Thornton L.L.P., 733 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that deepening insolvency is not valid theory of damages),
and Kaye v. Dupree (In re Avado Brands, Inc.), 358 B.R. 868, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006) (choosing not to recognize deepening insolvency as valid cause of action),
and Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Felt Mfg. Co. v. Foss (In re Felt
Mfg. Co.), 371 B.R. 589, 623 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (predicting that New Hampshire Supreme Court could not accept deepening insolvency as an independent
cause of action), and Joseph v. Frank (In re Troll Commc’ns, L.L.C.), 385 B.R. 110,
121 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (recognizing rejection of deepening insolvency under
Delaware law), and In re Parmalat, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (applying Illinois law to
hold that plaintiff’s deepening insolvency claim should be dismissed as duplicative
of malpractice claim), and Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906
A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as cause of action),
with Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 678 (3d
Cir. 2006) (finding that deepening insolvency is valid cause of action in Pennsylvania), and In re Parmalat Secs. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 560, 560, 573–77 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (examining deepening insolvency as theory of damages through dicta), and
NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG, 945 A.2d 132, 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2007) (holding that New Jersey state law recognizes deepening insolvency as valid theory of
damages and action), and Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 421 F.3d 989, 1003
(9th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with theory of deepening insolvency without determining whether it is valid cause of action), and Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 521
(3d Cir. 2008) (predicting that even though New Jersey Supreme Court or legislature has never recognized deepening insolvency as theory of damages it anticipates
that state will).
13. See Vieira v. AGM II, L.L.C. (In re Worldwide Wholesale Lumber, Inc.),
378 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (recognizing deepening insolvency as theory of damages for breach of fiduciary duty claim); Schnelling v. Crawford (In re
James River Coal Co.), 360 B.R. 139, 179–80 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (recognizing
deepening insolvency as theory of damages not independent cause of action); Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, L.L.C.), 325 B.R. 417, 429 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 2005) (examining deepening insolvency in context of theory of damages).
14. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d
340, 345–47 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that deepening insolvency tort claim is valid
in Pennsylvania).
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But like any novelty, deepening insolvency appeared to rapidly lose its
popularity.15 The turning point came from the highly influential Delaware Court of Chancery (“Chancery Court”) in the case of Trenwick
America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,16 where the court not only
affirmatively rejected deepening insolvency as a tort claim, but actually
reprimanded the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware for assuming that Delaware state law would support such a conclusion.17 Subsequently, the Trenwick court’s decision to discard deepening insolvency led
other courts to follow suit.18 Since 2006, many jurisdictions have either
completely rejected the theory, or at the very least, marginalized it.19
The Third Circuit originally appeared to be a firm supporter of deepening insolvency through its expansive holding in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,20 where the court first established
deepening insolvency as a viable tort claim in Pennsylvania.21 Later, the
15. See Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at *21 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 28, 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency as independent
tort); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (“Although deepening insolvency might harm a corporation’s shareholders, it does not, without more,
harm the corporation itself.”); see also Harrell, supra note 8, at 152–53 (“A major
problem with the deepening insolvency theory of tort liability is its novelty.”).
16. 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v.
Billett, No. 495, 2006 , 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 13, 2007).
17. See id. at 204 (“The concept of deepening insolvency has been discussed at
length in federal jurisprudence, perhaps because the term has the kind of stentorious academic ring that tends to dull the mind to the concept’s ultimate emptiness.”). Furthermore, the Delaware Chancery Court stated:
Delaware law imposes no absolute obligation on the board of a company
that is unable to pay its bills to cease operations and to liquidate. Even
when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith,
strategies to maximize the value of the firm. As a thoughtful federal decision recognizes, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code expresses a societal
recognition that an insolvent corporation’s creditors (and society as a
whole) may benefit if the corporation continues to conduct operations in
the hope of turning things around.
Id. (opining that theories such as deepening insolvency could not impose duty to
liquidate when State would like directors to put forth their utmost effort to save
insolvent corporation).
18. See Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 532 F.3d 355, 363
(5th Cir. 2008) (“In the Delaware Court of Chancery, the doctrine of deepening
insolvency as an independent cause of action or as a theory of damages was also
considered and rejected . . . .”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Propex,
Inc. v. BNP Paribas (In re Propex, Inc.), 415 B.R. 321, 331 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
2009) (“The current state of affairs with regard to deepening insolvency, as the
court sees it, is that the theory is still obscure and difficult to distinguish from
existing torts . . . .”); Christians v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 733 N.W.2d 803, 812
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that deepening insolvency is not recognized form
of corporate damage in Minnesota).
19. For a further discussion of how various state jurisdictions began to
marginalize deepening insolvency, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
21. See id. at 344 (“We conclude that ‘deepening insolvency’ constitutes a
valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law and that the Committee therefore has standing to bring this action.”). When the Lafferty holding first came out,
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Circuit seemed to follow the Delaware Chancery Court through its holding
in In re CitX Corp.22 There, the court unequivocally limited deepening
insolvency to conduct involving fraud and held that the theory only applied as an independent tort and not as a form of damages.23 Many practitioners and academics viewed the CitX decision as marginalizing the
holding of Lafferty, furthering the assumption that deepening insolvency
would meet the same fate in Pennsylvania that it had met in Delaware.24
Nonetheless, in the recent case In re Lemington Home for the Aged,25 the
Third Circuit surprised many practitioners by not only affirming the continued existence of deepening insolvency, but also vacating a dismissal of
the appellant’s deepening insolvency claim, strongly suggesting that the
tort still has its “teeth.”26
many academics and practitioners viewed it as the single most influential ruling on
deepening insolvency, particularly because it validated the theory as an independent cause of action in tort. See Laura Colasacco, Note, Where Were the Accountants?
Deepening Insolvency As a Means of Ensuring Accountants’ Presence When Corporate Turmoil Materializes, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 827 (2009) (“Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., is the pivotal case that defined deepening
insolvency as an independent tort.”). Through Lafferty, the Third Circuit was the
first federal circuit court to address the claim of deepening insolvency and embrace the concept of deepening insolvency as an independent tort. See Hugh M.
McDonald et al., Lafferty’s Orphan: The Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2008, at 1, 57–58 (“However, the theory did not fully
evolve until the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co. Inc.”).
22. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d
Cir. 2006).
23. See id. at 677 (“Although we did describe deepening insolvency as a ‘type
of injury,’ and a ‘theory of injury,’ we never held that it was a valid theory of damages for an independent cause of action.” (citations omitted)).
24. See Michelle M. Harner & Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Implications of North
American Catholic and Trenwick: Final Death Knell for Deepening Insolvency? Shift in
Directors’ Duties in the Zone of Insolvency?, 2008 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1 (“The Third
Circuit subsequently backed away from its position in Lafferty regarding deepening
insolvency and the types of injury subject to redress in CitX Corp.”). As one commentator noted:
[T]he Third Circuit in CitX took aim at deepening insolvency and successfully limited its reach in three ways: (1) the court held that deepening
insolvency may not be invoked as a theory of damages to support a malpractice cause of action; (2) the court ruled that a deepening insolvency
claim cannot be sustained solely on an allegation of negligent conduct;
and (3) the court ruled that Lafferty’s precedential value was limited to
courts within Pennsylvania.
Ian T. Mahoney, The CitX Decision: Has the Tort of “Deepening Insolvency” Gone Bankrupt?, 52 VILL. L. REV. 995, 1009 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
25. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington
Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011).
26. See D.J. Baker et. al., Corporate Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role
of Restructuring Counsel, 63 BUS. LAW. 855, 864 (2008) (discussing some threats unsecured creditors will pose to directors of bankrupt corporations and how these
threats, including deepening insolvency, have “teeth”); Third Circuit Address “Deepening Insolvency” Claims: In re Lemington Home, ALERT MEMO (Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton L.L.P., New York, N.Y.),Oct. 12, 2011, at 1, available at http://
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This Casebrief serves as an update on deepening insolvency within
the Third Circuit jurisprudence and aims to give legal practitioners a
guide to understanding the mechanisms of the controversial but resilient
tort.27 Part II provides a more detailed overview of the judicial decisions
that led to the development of deepening insolvency.28 Part III examines
the holding in Lemington and how the case fits into the Third Circuit jurisprudence.29 Finally, Part IV analyzes the potential impact of Lemington
and concludes that practitioners in Pennsylvania should continue to be
aware of the deepening insolvency tort when advising directors, officers,
and any professionals working for unsuccessful or insolvent
corporations.30
II. THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY
A.

Conceived from the Depths of Dicta

It is important to remember that deepening insolvency is not based
on any bankruptcy code or statute, but rather was born from common
law.31 As such, the exact origin of deepening insolvency is difficult to
pinpoint.32 However, it is widely believed that the theory evolved from
cases in the 1980s concerning breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors who fraudulently prolonged the life of their corporations.33 In
www.cgsh.com/files/News/1401f0e9-32a9-4a8d-b289-65dec0d39cf0/Presentation/
NewsAttachment/5d5a80fe-ace0-4577-86ff-663837aff027/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20
In%20re%20Lemington%20Home.pdf (warning clients that deepening insolvency
is still viable tort in Third Circuit); Third Circuit: In Pennsylvania, Creditors’ Deepening
Insolvency Claims Still Fair Game, GIBBONS BUS. LITIG. ALERT (Gibbons P.C., Newark,
N.J.), Nov. 4, 2011, available at http://www.businesslitigationalert.com/2011/11/
04/third-circuit-in-pennsylvania-creditors%E2%80%99-deepening-insolvencyclaims-still-fair-game/ (alerting practitioners that Third Circuit recently reaffirmed
deepening insolvency); Third Circuit Addresses Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Deepening
Insolvency Claims Under Pennsylvania Law, INSIGHTS (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom L.L.P., Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 3, 2011, available at http://www.skadden.
com/newsletters/Third_Circuit_Addresses_Breach_of_Fiduciary_Duty_and_Deepening_Insolvency_Claims_Under_Pennsylvania_Law.pdf (discussing return of
deepening insolvency in wake of Lemington holding by Third Circuit).
27. For a discussion on how the Lemington decision impacts practitioners, see
infra notes 122–46 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 34–78 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 79–121 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 122–46 and accompanying text.
31. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 638–39 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2005) (“The words ‘deepening insolvency’ are neither contained in the Bankruptcy Code, nor do they arise from other federal law, so the courts that consider
the theory . . . to be an actionable tort do so by predicting how their respective
state courts would rule when adopting a new cause of action.”).
32. See Vollbrecht & Gooley, supra note 11, at 169–78 (discussing history of
deepening insolvency and its possible origins).
33. See Elizabeth V. Tanis & Jennifer D. Fease, Emerging Issues in Deepening Insolvency: Causation and Pitfalls of Measuring Damages as the Debtor’s Liabilities, A.L.I.-
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these cases, directors would often attempt to use the in pari delicto defense
to argue that they could not be held liable for prolonging a corporation’s
life, under any circumstances, because doing so benefited the corporation.34 A New York district court faced such an argument in the case In re
Investors Funding Corporation of New York Securities Litigation.35 There, the
court ruled that extending the life of a corporation is not per se beneficial.36 Three years later, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht v. Brown,37 dealt
with similar facts and held that the in pari delicto defense did not apply
because extending the life of the corporation created an adverse interest.38 Accordingly, after the various courts began to consistently hold that
lengthening the existence of an unsuccessful corporation is not necessarily
good for the shareholders and creditors, the natural progression continued toward deepening insolvency.39
B.

An Unprecedented Growth Spurt

The idea that directors could be held liable for prolonging the life of
an insolvent corporation quickly garnered the interests of creditors and
trustees of bankruptcy estates.40 Prior to deepening insolvency, unsecured
creditors had very few options to recover their losses from a bankrupt corA.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J., Apr. 2010, at 46–47 (reviewing history of
deepening insolvency and its roots that developed from in pari delicto defense).
34. See Henry S. Bryans, Claims Against Lawyers by Bankruptcy Trustees—A First
Course on the In Pari Delicto Defense, 66 BUS. LAW. 587, 597 (2011) (“The defense of
in pari delicto at common law was based ‘on two premises: first, that courts should
not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second,
that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality.’ ”). With an in pari delicto claim, defendants are arguing that they
should not be held liable for actions that can be imputed onto the plaintiff. See id.
at 595 (explaining mechanics of in pari delicto defense in bankruptcy trustee situations). In the context of corporations, a director’s actions can be imputed onto
the corporation if it was done within the scope of the director’s duty and for the
corporation. See id. at 597 (describing when director’s actions are imputed to corporation). Thus, a shareholder cannot sue a director who engaged in fraudulent
activities if the fraud actually benefited the corporation. See id. (detailing how in
pari delicto precludes bankruptcy trustee’s claims against directors).
35. Bloor v. Dansker, (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F.
Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
36. See id. at 541 (discussing how corporations are not like biological entities
where prolonging their existence is automatically beneficial).
37. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
38. See id. at 1350 (“[F]or the corporate body is ineluctably damaged by the
deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor liability.”).
The Seventh Circuit was combating the notion that a corporation cannot sue for
conduct that prolonged its life, regardless of whether it was done fraudulently. See
id. (“For each of these cases rests upon a seriously flawed assumption, i.e., that the
fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s life beyond insolvency is automatically
to be considered a benefit to the corporation’s interests.”).
39. See Tanis & Fease, supra note 36, at 607–09 (describing how deepening
insolvency theory evolved from failed in pari delicto defenses).
40. See generally David E. Gordon, Comment, The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: Beyond Trustees and Creditors’ Committees, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 221
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poration.41 Consequently, some commentators argue that deepening insolvency became rapidly popular out of necessity.42 Others have a more
cynical view.43 Opponents of deepening insolvency often argue that the
theory only gained traction during the early twenty-first century, when
large corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom ignited a public
outcry.44 Yet for whatever reason, the rapid rise of deepening insolvency
is undeniable.45 Within a couple decades, what started out as dicta
evolved into a complex cause of action and theory of damages in several
jurisdictions.46
Despite deepening insolvency’s initial popularity, the theory lacked
the substance to be considered a bona fide tort until the Third Circuit
definitively defined it as such in Lafferty.47 There, the court dealt with a
(discussing how deepening insolvency expanded remedies available for creditors
and bankruptcy trust estates.)
41. See Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be
Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 806 (2007) (describing rights of
unsecured creditors as akin to residual claimants of dissolved corporation).
42. See Franklin, supra note 7, at 477–78 (detailing events such as collapse of
Enron as catalyst for deepening insolvency and arguing that deepening insolvency
is needed to further regulate corporate misconduct).
43. See J.B. Heaton, Deepening Insolvency, 30 J. CORP. L. 465, 500 (2005) (arguing that certain notions of deepening insolvency are “unsupported in financial
economics and inconsistent with the traditional understandings and economic
functions of corporate injury”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 537 (arguing that
deepening insolvency should not be viable tort or theory of damages).
44. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 536 (describing public hysteria caused by
Enron scandal and how this may have led to juror support of deepening
insolvency).
45. See The Deepening Insolvency Risk, MEMORANDUM (Foster Pepper P.L.L.C.,
Seattle, Wash.), June 1, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.foster.com/pdf/DeepeningInsolvencyRisk.pdf (“The past few years have seen an ever increasing number
of reported lawsuits asserting . . . ‘deepening insolvency.’ From only 4 or 5 in the
year 2000 to well over 55 in the years 2004 and 2005. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that far more have been filed and not reported.”).
46. See Willett, supra note 3, at 550 (discussing rapid development of deepening insolvency). A partner at the prominent law firm, Bingham McCutchen L.L.P.,
Sabin Willett actually compared deepening insolvency to evolution in the following
manner:
Doctrines are like life: complex organisms evolve from the most unremarkable amino acids. Within a generation of Schacht, federal courts
were issuing pronouncements that “ ‘deepening insolvency’ constitutes a
valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law,” and that Delaware recognizes a “tort of deepening insolvency.” In In re Exide Technologies, Inc., a
court let discovery proceed on a “deepening insolvency” claim against
lenders who make loans to distressed buyers. This is evolution at light speed.
What was merely a failed defense in Schacht now walks on all fours and
demands recognition by legal taxonomists as a fully-fledged cause of
action.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
47. See Gordon, supra note 43, at 224–25 (“Beginning with a 2001 decision
from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v.
R.F. Lafferty & Co., courts began to recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action.”); McDonald et al., supra note 22, at 57 (“Despite the narrow
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committee of unsecured creditors filing a derivative action on behalf of
the debtor corporation against the board of directors.48 The committee’s
complaint alleged violations of federal securities laws, breach of fiduciary
duty, and other related claims arising from a ponzi scheme in which the
defendants were fraudulently issuing corporate bonds.49 As a basis for
these claims, and because a derivative action requires a plaintiff to allege
harms inflicted on the corporation, the committee cited deepening insolvency.50 Although the Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the district
court’s decision to dismiss the committee’s claims, the court affirmatively
acknowledged deepening insolvency as an independent tort claim in
Pennsylvania.51 The Third Circuit based its opinion on the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in Schacht and predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would soon establish deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action.52

application of Investors Funding and Schacht, the concept was greatly expanded
nearly two decades after Investors Funding by the Third Circuit in Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co. Inc.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 538
(“Lafferty is generally recognized as the first reported case that established deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action in tort.”).
48. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d
340, 344 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing procedural posture of case).
49. See id. at 344 (discussing background facts from case and how it arose
from collapsed ponzi scheme).
50. See id. at 349–51 (examining claims made).
51. See id. at 359 (affirming district court’s decision to grant summary judgment against appellant’s deepening insolvency claims).
52. See id. at 350 (citing Seventh Circuit as basis for rationale that deepening
insolvency should be considered independent tort in Third Circuit). The Lafferty
court quoted the following passage from the Seventh Circuit’s Schacht holding:
[C]ases [that oppose “deepening insolvency”] rest[ ] upon a seriously
flawed assumption, i.e., that the fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s life beyond insolvency is automatically to be considered a benefit to
the corporation’s interests. This premise collides with common sense, for
the corporate body is ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor liability. Indeed, in most
cases, it would be crucial that the insolvency of the corporation be disclosed, so that shareholders may exercise their right to dissolve the corporation in order to cut their losses. Thus, acceptance of a rule which
would bar a corporation from recovering damages due to the hiding of
information concerning its insolvency would create perverse incentives
for wrong-doing officers and directors to conceal the true financial condition of the corporation from the corporate body as long as possible.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th
Cir. 1983)). Furthermore, the Lafferty court concluded that deepening insolvency
was based on the fundamentally sound rationale that increasing an already insolvent corporation’s debt hurts the corporation. See id. at 349 (“First and foremost,
the theory is essentially sound. . . . Even when a corporation is insolvent, its corporate property may have value. The fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt
can damage that value in several ways.”).
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The Third Circuit’s holding in Lafferty had a ripple effect on not only
the courts in its own jurisdiction, but on other circuits as well.53 Most
notably, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware cited Lafferty in
holding that deepening insolvency was also a viable tort in Delaware.54
Consequently, after Lafferty, the theory grew exponentially to the point
where anyone involved in deepening a corporation’s insolvency could be
held liable, even creditors and lawyers.55 Furthermore, some courts began
to hold that mere negligence could be enough to support a deepening
insolvency claim.56 This evolution was somewhat unexpected, considering
that the court in Lafferty simply found deepening insolvency to be a valid
tort and still affirmed a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.57 Regardless,
many academics and practitioners began to fear that the theory would
grow too large.58
C.

The Ringing Death Knell

Just when deepening insolvency gained significant momentum in the
courts, the tide turned against it.59 Although many scholarly articles criti53. See Crowley v. Chait, No. 85-2441, 2004 WL 5434953, at *18–19 (D.N.J.
Aug. 25, 2004) (citing Lafferty to hold that plaintiff has valid deepening insolvency
claim); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors & R2 Invs., LDC v. Credit Suisse
First Bos. (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 752 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (citing
Lafferty to hold that deepening insolvency is valid tort); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2001) (citing Lafferty to hold plaintiffs pled sufficient facts for deepening insolvency claim).
54. See Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 752 (“[B]ased on the Third Circuit’s decision
in Lafferty and the Delaware courts’ policy of providing a remedy for an injury, I
conclude that Delaware Supreme Court would recognize a claim for deepening
insolvency when there has been damage to corporate property.”).
55. See Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Grp.), 316 B.R. 451,
454–55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2004) (examining how shareholder plaintiffs brought action against creditor for extending loans to corporation prior to bankruptcy and
increasing corporation’s insolvency, which led to deepening insolvency claim).
56. See In re Flagship Healthcare, 269 B.R. at 727–28 (holding that plaintiff’s
allegations of defendant’s negligent conduct were sufficient for deepening insolvency claim); Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 421 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing deepening insolvency for unintentionally misrepresenting firm’s
insolvency).
57. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 344 (affirming district court’s holding granting
summary judgment for defendant and dismissing deepening insolvency claim).
58. For a discussion of the various academics and scholars that criticized
deepening insolvency, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. See McDonald et al., supra note 22, at 60 (discussing how tide turned
against deepening insolvency and how courts began to reject theory). The CitX
and Trenwick holdings by the Third Circuit and Delaware Chancery Court, respectively, were seen as the catalyst for many other jurisdictions rejecting deepening
insolvency. See id. (“The decisions in CitX and Trenwick have led some courts to
take a more narrow view of deepening insolvency, with many courts refusing to
recognize the theory as a cause of action or greatly restricting it as a theory of
damages.”). See also Buckley v. Deloitte & Touche USA L.L.P., No. 06-3291, 2007
WL 1491403, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2007) (noting deepening insolvency is not
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cized the theory, the turning point came from the Delaware Chancery
Court in Trenwick.60 There, the court dealt with a holding company that
had been rendered insolvent by its acquisition of too many subsidiary insurance companies negatively affected the 9/11 attacks.61 The plaintiffs
filed claims under deepening insolvency and the Delaware Chancery
Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that deepening
insolvency was not a valid cause of action under state law.62 The Delaware
Supreme Court promptly affirmed the Chancery Court’s ruling.63
The Delaware Chancery Court’s primary concerns regarding deepening insolvency were similar to those raised by practitioners and scholars
who criticized the theory.64 More specifically, the Trenwick court recognized that directors and officers of a corporation may occasionally need to
take on additional debt to secure a business objective.65 Thus, the tort of
deepening insolvency could effectively render these directors personal
guarantors of these business decisions, which runs against the gambit of
corporate law that seeks to give directors substantial deference in their
business decisions.66 Other concerns were the redundancy of deepening
theory of damages for malpractice action, but plaintiff alleged damages on other
grounds); Liquidating Tr. of the Amcast Unsecured Creditor Liquidating Trust v.
Baker (In re Amcast Indus. Corp.), 365 B.R. 91, 119 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding deepening insolvency not recognized in Ohio); Schnelling v. Crawford (In re
James River Coal Co.), 360 B.R. 139, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (finding deepening insolvency not recognized in Virginia); Kaye v. Dupree (In re Avado Brands,
Inc.), 358 B.R. 868, 888 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency
theory); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, L.L.C. (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820,
848–49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (finding deepening insolvency “to be an impermissible measure of damages”); Christians v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 733 N.W.2d 803,
812 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (disapproving of deepening insolvency theory); Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 2007 OK Civ App 8, ¶ 11, 152
P.3d 897, 900 (holding deepening insolvency “not a recognized measure of
damages”).
60. Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168
(Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2006 ,
2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 13, 2007) (recognizing that deepening insolvency
began to fall into disfavor).
61. See id. at 175–86 (describing facts of case)
62. See id. at 204 (“Delaware law imposes no absolute obligation on the board
of a company that is unable to pay its bills to cease operations and to liquidate.”).
The ruling was part of a subsection of the opinion entitled “Delaware Law Does
Not Recognize a Cause of Action for So-Called ‘Deepening Insolvency.’ ” See id.
63. See Trenwick Litig. Trust v. Billet, 931 A.2d 438, at *1 (Del. 2007) (“[T]he
final judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed on the basis of and for
the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery in its opinion dated August 10,
2006.”).
64. See Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 204–08 (explaining holding that Delaware law
does not recognize tort of deepening insolvency).
65. See id. (hypothesizing consequences of deepening insolvency and how it
would affect directors’ ability to occasionally take on more debt to save company).
66. See id. at 205 (“If the board of an insolvent corporation, acting with due
diligence and good faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes will increase
the corporation’s value, but that also involves the incurrence of additional debt, it
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insolvency with similar breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims.67 Ultimately, when the Delaware Chancery Court struck down deepening insolvency, many assumed the tort would fade into obscurity.68
Shortly after the Delaware Chancery Court published its opinion in
Trenwick, the Third Circuit started to backtrack on its expansive Lafferty
holding through its decision in CitX.69 There, the Third Circuit dealt with
a bankruptcy trustee suing a debtor’s accounting firm for professional
malpractice and deepening insolvency.70 The CitX holding had three significant effects: (1) it unequivocally rejected deepening insolvency as a
theory of damages for claims such as professional malpractice or breach of
fiduciary duty, (2) it limited the definition of deepening insolvency to acts
of fraud, and (3) it explicitly limited deepening insolvency’s applicability
to Pennsylvania.71
The CitX holding appeared to signal the beginning of the end for
deepening insolvency in Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit in general,
perhaps more so than the Trenwick holding from Delaware.72 After Lafdoes not become a guarantor of that strategy’s success.”). The idea of giving deference to the business decisions of corporate managers—such as directors and officers—comes from the business judgment rule, a common law tenet widely
followed by many state jurisdictions. See Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 8 (2010) (reviewing history of business judgment
rule). There are a number of reasons why courts employ the business judgment
rule, but the overall focus is to maximize wealth. See id. (“Scholars argue that
‘[w]ealth is maximized when corporations are run by directors who know that
their decisions will be reviewed by investors, by analysts, by stockholders, and by
business partners—but not by the courts.’ ” (quoting David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (2007))).
67. See Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 205 (explaining that deepening insolvency is redundant to other claims that shareholders can bring against directors and officers
of corporation). The Delaware Chancery Court then clarified that just because
deepening insolvency is not a valid claim, it does not mean it is giving directors
more leeway for misconduct. See id. (“The rejection of an independent cause of
action for deepening insolvency does not absolve directors of insolvent corporations of responsibility. Rather, it remits plaintiffs to the contents of their traditional toolkit, which contains, among other things, causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and for fraud.”).
68. See Harner & Brighton, supra note 27, at 1 (explaining effect of Trenwick
decision as signaling end for deepening insolvency).
69. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672,
681 (3d Cir. 2006). For a discussion on how the Third Circuit limited its holding
in Lafferty through its holding in CitX, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
70. See In re CitX at 674–77 (discussing facts of case). In CitX, the Third Circuit dealt with a bankruptcy trustee suing an accounting firm that was alleged to
have provided the financial statements used to fraudulently procure investor funds
and prolong the life of a corporation that was clearly insolvent. See id. (reviewing
contextual background facts).
71. See Mahoney, supra note 27, at 1009 (describing significance of CitX decision and how it limited expansive holding of Lafferty).
72. See Fehribach v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 493 F.3d 905, 908–09 (7th Cir.
2007) (using Trenwick and CitX holdings to support conclusion that deepening
insolvency is not valid independent claim); Joseph v. Frank (In re Troll Commc’ns,
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ferty, many viewed the Third Circuit as the harbinger of deepening insolvency, so when the court essentially limited Lafferty’s holding only a few
years later, it was an unexpected development.73 In fact, numerous publications were released in response to the CitX decision, most of which predicted deepening insolvency’s decline.74 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit
did not overtly strike down deepening insolvency in Pennsylvania and the
tort survived, albeit in what many assumed to be a deteriorated state.75
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT REVIVES DEEPENING INSOLVENCY
IN THE LEMINGTON DECISION
In the years after CitX, deepening insolvency was greatly marginalized.76 Directors, officers, accountants, and lawyers breathed a collective
sigh of relief as almost everyone predicted that the CitX holding would
L.L.C.), 385 B.R. 110, 121–22 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (citing CitX in context of invalidating deepening insolvency as independent cause of action in Delaware). The
Troll decision is in stark contrast to the decision by the same court only a few years
prior in In re Exide Techs., Inc., which evidences the extremely volatile nature of
deepening insolvency in federal courts. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors & R2 Invs., LDC v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R.
732, 752 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding that Delaware law would support deepening insolvency as independent cause of action).
73. See Jo Ann J. Brighton, Deepening the Blows Against Deepening Insolvency?,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2006, at 24, 24 (“CitX has dealt quite a blow to the theory
of deepening insolvency.”). In fact, a few days after the Third Circuit came out
with its holding in CitX, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, applying Delaware law, dismissed a deepening insolvency claim
on the basis that CitX explicitly limited the tort to Pennsylvania law. See Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Verestar, Inc. v. Am. Tower Corp. (In re Verestar, Inc.), 343 B.R. 444, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“And even more recently
the Third Circuit . . . went out of its way to observe, ‘nothing we said in Lafferty
compels any extension of the doctrine beyond Pennsylvania.’ ” (quoting In re CitX
Corp., 448 F.3d 672, 680 n.11 (3d Cir. 2006))).
74. See Brighton, supra note 76, at 24 (describing reaction to CitX); Mahoney,
supra note 27, at 1017 (arguing that CitX decision limited Lafferty court’s expansive
holding).
75. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 673 (discussing holding of case where Lafferty precedent is not overruled but limited).
76. See McDonald et al., supra note 22, at 61 (“As the development of the
deepening insolvency theory indicates and recent decisions make clear, deepening
insolvency cannot exist as a theory of liability—either as a freestanding cause of
action or theory of damages—without undermining existing legal doctrines.”).
Only a few years ago and prior to CitX, it appeared that deepening insolvency
would become the tort of choice for unsecured creditors of bankruptcy corporations. See Mahoney, supra note 27, at 1018 (“Five years ago, trustees’ and creditors’
committees seemed poised to plunder the deep pockets of corporations’ auditors,
directors and lenders under an emerging theory of liability known as deepening
insolvency.”). However, since the CitX decision, the future of deepening insolvency appeared to be in doubt. See id. at 1018–19 (“In its recent CitX decision, the
Third Circuit drastically narrowed the misguided expansion of deepening insolvency by predicating deepening insolvency on fraud, emphatically rejecting deepening insolvency as a measure of damages and limiting the precedential scope of
Lafferty to Pennsylvania.”).
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render deepening insolvency a feeble tag-along tort at best.77 Nevertheless, such comfort proved to be premature.78 Through its recent holding
in Lemington, the Third Circuit explicitly clarified two important points:
(1) absent an en banc decision that overrules CitX and Lafferty, deepening
insolvency is still a viable claim in Pennsylvania, and (2) while the tort is
still a viable claim, it will be readily enforced.79
A.

The Facts Surrounding the Revival

Lemington Home for the Aged (“Lemington”), a non-profit corporation, operated a nursing home considered to be a historic landmark in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.80 Mary Peck Bond, the daughter of a local abolitionist, founded the home in 1877 to care for the swelling population of
destitute and elderly African Americans in the city.81 From this modest
beginning, the home expanded and continued its operations in Pittsburgh
for over a century, becoming the oldest elderly care facility in the country
by 2005.82 Nevertheless, starting in the 1980s, the home was beset with
financial and managerial problems.83 By 1999, Lemington operated at a
loss and became completely insolvent.84 To compound the financial
77. See Third Circuit Limits Scope of Liability for “Deepening Insolvency”, BANKR.
BULL. (Weil, Gotshal & Manges L.L.P., New York, N.Y.), Aug., 2006, available at
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8572 (“Accordingly, it is encouraging that the Third Circuit rejected the opportunity to expand Lafferty, and instead chose to limit Lafferty’s reach. While the Third Circuit in CITX did not
elaborate on its rationale for limiting causes of action of deepening insolvency to
situations where, as in Lafferty, the defendants engaged in intentional fraud, it is
likely that the court observed the possible perils that would befall failing companies from the widespread acceptance of a stand–alone cause of action of deepening insolvency arising from mere negligence. Instead, plaintiffs must prove
liability under traditional theories, such as negligence and malpractice. It is also
significant that the Third Circuit, one of the foremost proponents of recognizing a
cause of action of deepening insolvency, decided to limit the types of conduct that
could lead to deepening insolvency liability. Other courts may once again follow
the Third Circuit’s lead and limit the types of conduct that could lead to deepening insolvency liability.”).
78. For a discussion on how a few large law firms reacted to the Lemington
holding, see supra note 29 and the accompanying text.
79. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington
Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282, 292 (3d Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding
lower court’s summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s deepening insolvency
claim).
80. See id. at 285 (discussing history of Lemington elderly care home).
81. See id. (examining factual context of case).
82. Rick Stouffer, Lemington Home for the Aged Files for Bankruptcy, PITTSBURGH
TRIB. LIVE (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_32
3974.html (“The Lemington Center is acknowledged as the nation’s oldest continuously operating African-American-sponsored long-term care facility for the
elderly.”).
83. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 285–87 (discussing how financial condition of
Lemington deteriorated starting in 1980s).
84. See id. (addressing facts of case).
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problems, in 2004 two members of the home died in circumstances that
suggested neglect.85
The committee of unsecured creditors (appellant) alleged that the
board of directors for Lemington had contemplated bankruptcy after
these deaths, but did not actually file until over a year later.86 During this
time, the directors investigated options such as loans and mergers, but
everything fell through and bankruptcy appeared to be a foregone conclusion.87 Between January and March of 2005, Lemington’s board met to
discuss future plans for bankruptcy and how to handle the home in the
meantime.88 In these meetings, the board decided to stop admitting new
patients to the home and enacted a plan to transfer the home’s principal
charitable asset to Lemington Elder Care, a sister facility.89 Lemington’s
board of directors all simultaneously served on the board for Lemington
Elder Care.90 Eventually, Lemington filed for bankruptcy in April, 2005.91
For purposes of appellant’s deepening insolvency claims, the crucial fact
was that Lemington’s board definitively decided to file for bankruptcy in
January, 2005, but operated the home at a deficit before actually filing in
April, 2005—a delay of four months.92
After Lemington failed to come up with a buyer during a bankruptcy
conference held on June 23, 2005, the bankruptcy court ordered the
85. See id. at 286–87 (discussing two negligence related deaths that occurred
in Lemington). The court gave the impression that from the year 1999 forward,
the Lemington home was in utter disarray, stemming primarily from their chief
administrator being completely unqualified for the position. See id. (“In 2001, a
study funded by the Pittsburgh Foundation recommended that the Board replace
Causey with a ‘qualified, seasoned nursing home administrator’ . . . .”). Furthermore, the Chief Financial Officer for Lemington failed to keep any accurate financial records. See id. (“In December of 2002, Defendant James Shealey became the
Home’s Chief Financial Officer. Shealey failed to maintain a general ledger, and
the Home’s financial and billing records were in deplorable condition.”).
86. See id. at 286 (discussing how Lemington’s chief administrator suggested
bankruptcy in 2004, one year earlier than when board decided to actually file for
bankruptcy).
87. See id. at 287 (“At its meeting on January 6, 2005, the Board considered
options in case a proposed merger with the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center did not occur. The Board considered two options: bankruptcy and
restructuring.”).
88. See id. (discussing background facts of case and specifically when Lemington’s Board met to discuss bankruptcy and future plans).
89. See id. (“[N]otes from a Board meeting held on March 15, 2005 indicate
discussion of plans to transfer the Home’s principal charitable asset, the Lemington Home Fund, held by the Pittsburgh Foundation, to Lemington Elder Care,
an affiliated entity.”).
90. See id. at 285 (describing how Lemington’s board members were all members of another board for affiliated corporation).
91. See id. at 288 (“On April 13, 2005, the Home filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.”).
92. See id. at 287 (discussing how Board did not file for bankruptcy until April
2005).
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home to be closed and its residents transferred to other facilities.93 The
appellants filed an adversarial proceeding against Lemington’s board and
officers, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and deepening insolvency.94
Subsequently, the joint defendants filed for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion, holding that the business judgment rule
applied to preclude the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims.95 The
district court also found that the appellants failed to allege enough facts
suggesting fraud to have a viable deepening insolvency claim, and even if
they did allege sufficient facts, the in pari delicto defense precluded the
claim as well.96
B.

The Third Circuit Affirms that Deepening Insolvency Exists
as an Independent Tort Claim

The Third Circuit began its discussion of the appellant’s deepening
insolvency claim by acknowledging that the cause of action had not yet
been recognized by the Pennsylvania state courts.97 However, citing its
own precedent in CitX, the court set forth the necessary framework for
claimants to allege deepening insolvency.98 More specifically, the Lemington court held that deepening insolvency exists as a tort claim in Pennsylvania when it can be proven that an injury to corporate property
occurred through the “fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.”99 Reiterating the holding of CitX, the court
93. See id. at 289 (examining bankruptcy hearing).
94. See id. (describing procedural posture of case and appellant’s claims).
95. See id. at 291 (“The District Court, however, found that the business judgment rule as well as the doctrine of in pari delicto applied to shield the directors and
officers from liability.”). The business judgment rule has been codified in Pennsylvania. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5715(d) (West 2011) (“Absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or self-dealing, any act as the board of directors, a
committee of the board or an individual director shall be presumed to be in the
best interests of the corporation.”). The purpose of the business judgment rule
has been explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as follows:
The business judgment rule should insulate officers and directors
from judicial intervention in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, if challenged decisions were within the scope of the directors’ authority, if they
exercised reasonable diligence, and if they honestly and rationally believed their decisions were in the best interests of the company. It is obvious that a court must examine the circumstances surrounding the
decisions in order to determine if the conditions warrant application of
the business judgment rule.
Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1048 (Pa. 1997). For a further discussion of
the business judgment rule and its origins, see supra note 69.
96. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 289 (describing district court’s holding).
97. See id. at 293 (“This cause of action has not been formally recognized by
Pennsylvania state courts.”).
98. See id. at 294 (citing CitX case to describe requisite elements for deepening insolvency).
99. See id. (quoting In re Citx Corp, 448 F.3d 672, 677 (3d. Cir. 2006)) (discussing state of deepening insolvency claims in Pennsylvania) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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reaffirmed that mere negligence is not enough to support a deepening
insolvency claim.100 Then the court proceeded to clarify the definition of
“fraud,” for purposes of deepening insolvency.101
Despite affirming the CitX court’s holding that the tort of deepening
insolvency continues in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit’s enthusiasm for
this decision was noticeably more tempered than when it first recognized
deepening insolvency in Lafferty.102 In footnote six of the opinion, the
court recognized that “courts and commentators have increasingly called
into question the viability of ‘deepening insolvency’ as an independent
cause of action.”103 Still, the court opined that absent an en banc decision, a precedential opinion such as Lafferty cannot be overturned.104 Additionally, the court implied Lemington might be distinguishable from
Lafferty because the insolvent corporation in Lemington was a non-profit,
but it declined to raise the issue sua sponte.105 Such a suggestion does,
however, leave the door open for future opportunities to further limit
deepening insolvency claims from the expansive precedent of Lafferty.106
C.

The Third Circuit Demonstrates that Deepening Insolvency
Will Still Be Enforced

Notwithstanding the Third Circuit’s apparent acknowledgment of
deepening insolvency’s debatable validity in footnote six, a closer examination of the court’s rationale for vacating the district court order strongly
100. See id. (“[A]claim of negligence cannot sustain a deepening-insolvency
cause of action.”).
101. See id. (discussing deepening insolvency). For a discussion of the court’s
definition of “fraud,” see infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
102. Compare Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 349–53 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing rationale behind deepening insolvency to hold that Pennsylvania law supports deepening insolvency as independent
cause of action), and Gregg W. Mackuse, Damages for “Deepening Insolvency”: A Defendant’s Worst Nightmare?, 74 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 42, 42 (2003) (“The [Lafferty] decision
can have serious consequences for corporate officers and directors as well as for
third-party professionals who have dealt with a failed company. . . . The doctrine
may become one of choice given the number of bankruptcies and other business
failures resulting from current economic conditions.”), with Lemington, 659 F.3d at
294 n.6 (“As Appellees have noted in their brief, courts and commentators have
increasingly called into question the viability of ‘deepening insolvency’ as an independent cause of action. Even if our precedent is erroneous, however, it can only
be overturned by this Court en banc.”) (citation omitted).
103. Lemington, 659 F.3d at 294 n.6.
104. See id. (discussing what it would take to overrule Lafferty and invalidate
deepening insolvency claim in Pennsylvania).
105. See id. (“Moreover, because no party argued that the concept of deepening insolvency may not apply to, or may involve a different standard for, a nonprofit corporation, we will not address that issue.”).
106. See id. (suggesting that distinctions can be drawn between regular corporations and non-profit corporations for purposes of determining deepening
insolvency).
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implies that the tort will be readily enforced.107 In holding that summary
judgment against the appellant’s deepening insolvency claims must be vacated, the Lemington court cited a number of specific facts.108 First, the
court opined that within the four-month period from when Lemington’s
board decided to file for bankruptcy and when the corporation actually
filed, significant damage was caused “to the detriment of its creditors.”109
Second, the court noted the potential for fraud in the directors’ decisions
to: delay the bankruptcy filing, cease admitting new patients, not disclose
their financial situation to creditors, and omit key information about expenses in the post-petition operating reports required by the bankruptcy
court.110 Next, the court implied that in pari delicto did not preclude the
appellant’s deepening insolvency claims because there was evidence that
the board’s fraudulent actions—such as transferring Lemington’s assets to
other entities—were on its own behalf, triggering the adverse interest exception to the equitable defense.111 Additionally, the court in Lemington
noted that the appellees continued to conduct business with vendors after
deciding to file bankruptcy and failed to collect Medicare receivables.112
The culmination of all of these facts led the Third Circuit to hold
that—“in the light most favorable to the [appellants]”—a reasonable jury
could find that the appellees committed deepening insolvency.113 But if
the court in Lemington wanted to marginalize deepening insolvency with107. See id. at 295 (finding district court’s summary judgment dismissal “inappropriate” because there existed “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
directors and officers fraudulently contributed to deepening the insolvency” of
Lemington Home).
108. See id. at 293–95 (examining facts of case which led to court’s holding on
appellant’s deepening insolvency claims).
109. See id. at 295 (noting appellant’s allegations that Lemington board’s actions caused harm to corporation).
110. See id. at 294 (discussing how appellees omitted expenses in post-petition
monthly reports to bankruptcy court).
111. See id. at 293–94 (discussing in pari delicto defense and adverse interest
exception). The Lemington court did not explicitly discuss the in pari delicto defense in the context of the appellant’s deepening insolvency claim, but rather examined the equitable defense in the context of the appellant’s breach of fiduciary
duty claims. See id. However, in the Lafferty holding, the court applied in pari
delicto to affirm the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of the deepening
insolvency claims as well as the breach of fiduciary duty claims. See Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“We conclude that ‘deepening insolvency’ constitutes a valid cause of action
under Pennsylvania state law . . . . However, evaluating the Committee’s claims . . .
we hold that because the Committee, standing in the shoes of the debtors, was in
pari delicto with the third parties it is suing, its claims were properly dismissed.”).
Consequently, the Third Circuit implies that in pari delicto and the adverse interest
exception can run against both fiduciary duty and deepening insolvency claims.
See Lemington 659 F.3d at 293–94 (discussing adverse interest exception to in pari
delicto).
112. See Lemington 659 F.3d at 294–95 (examining facts pertinent to deepening insolvency claim).
113. See id. at 295 (holding that summary judgment dismissal against appellant’s deepening insolvency claims should be vacated).
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out completely overturning Lafferty, this case provided ample leeway to do
so. This is because, as the district court held, evidence of fraudulent intent in Lemington was tenuous, especially considering that the facts did not
indicate a clear motive to defraud.114 Thus, unlike CitX and Lafferty,
which dealt with ponzi schemes, it would have been plausible to conclude
that the board of directors for Lemington was merely grossly negligent.115
This is corroborated by the fact that in many of the meetings where the
allegedly fraudulent decisions took place, attendance by members of the
board was less than fifty percent.116 In the end, however, the Lemington
court faced a judicial coin-flip, with facts that could have gone equally for
or against the deepening insolvency claim.117 By vacating the summary
judgment order and landing on the appellant’s side, the Third Circuit
strongly implied its willingness to enforce the controversial tort—sending
a clear message that deepening insolvency is still alive and well.118
IV. THE IMPACT OF LEMINGTON’S HOLDING ON
THIRD CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE

THE

CURRENT

Following the Lemington decision, many law firms with significant
practice groups or clients in Pennsylvania noted that deepening insolvency
“is back.”119 But as the Lemington court mentioned in footnote six, an
outright reversal of Lafferty and CitX was never the expected outcome, bar114. See id. at 293–95 (discussing facts relevant to determining presence of
fraud for purposes of deepening insolvency review); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin, No. 10-800, 2010 WL 4275252, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Oct.
25, 2010) (“[P]laintiff has failed to create a material issue of fact regarding the
claims of fraud. There are simply no facts by which a reasonable trier of fact could
find that defendants committed or precipitated any type of fraud. At most, their
actions amount to negligence . . . .”), vacated, 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011).
115. See Baldwin, 2010 WL 4275252, at *12 (opining that conduct of Lemington’s board, at most, amounts to gross negligence but not fraud).
116. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 287 (“Attendance at Board meetings was often
below 50%.”).
117. See id. at 285–96 (discussing facts of case and considerations for deepening insolvency claim).
118. See Watch Out Directors and Officers: Third Circuit Keeps “Deepening Insolvency” Action Alive, NEWS (Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones L.L.P., Wilmington,
Del.), Nov. 30, 2011, available at http://www.pszjlaw.com/news-97.html (discussing
“return” of deepening insolvency in wake of Lemington); ALERT MEMO, supra note
29 (warning clients that deepening insolvency is back in Third Circuit); Court Finds
Material Issues of Fact Regarding Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Deepening Insolvency,
CR&B ALERT (Reed Smith L.L.P., Pittsburgh, Pa.) Dec. 2011, at 7, available at
http://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/1c9b37ad-7a77-436f-94fe-42c0858e5
ecb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/be87db9f-54bf-44b8-9de9-60e934cf33
eb/crab1211.pdf (“[T]he case expands creditors’ abilities to hold directors and
officers accountable for the mismanagement of corporations.”); INSIGHTS, supra
note 29 (discussing return of deepening insolvency in wake of Lemington holding
by Third Circuit).
119. For a discussion of law firms that have taken notice of the Lemington decision, see supra notes 29 and 115 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-4\VLR404.txt

758

unknown

Seq: 20

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

5-DEC-12

12:11

[Vol. 57: p. 739

ring an en banc decision.120 Thus, what is most startling about the Lemington holding is not that the Third Circuit reaffirmed the viability of
deepening insolvency in Pennsylvania, but that the court actually supported a deepening insolvency claim based on the facts of the case.121
Consequently, Lemington is significant to the Third Circuit jurisprudence
on deepening insolvency for three principle reasons.122 First, the holding
applies the framework for a deepening insolvency claim set out by CitX.123
Second, it explicitly defines “fraud” for purposes of determining deepening insolvency.124 And finally, it gives notice to corporations and bankruptcy practitioners by providing a factual example of what is sufficient for
a deepening insolvency claim to survive summary judgment in the postCitX jurisprudence.125
A.

Clarifying the Framework Set Forth By CitX

Following the Lemington decision, practitioners should be aware that a
successful deepening insolvency claim must prove three elements: (1) “an
injury to the debtor’s corporate property” (2) caused by (3) “fraudulent
expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.”126
Again, the Third Circuit has reiterated that for a deepening insolvency
claim, negligent actions that inadvertently prolong a corporation’s life are
not enough, even if such actions cause a detriment to corporate value.127
Consequently, a successful claim must include factual allegations of
fraud.128
120. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 295 n.6 (discussing need for en banc review to
overturn precedential opinion).
121. See generally Third Circuit Revives Committee’s Deepening Insolvency and Breach
of Fiduciary Duty Claims, THE BANKR. STRATEGIST, (ALM Media Props., L.L.C., New
York, N.Y.), Dec. 2011, available at http://freebornpeters.com/custom/BankruptcyStrategistArticle_1.3.2012.pdf (discussing how Lemington holding puts directors and officers of insolvency corporations on notice that creditors will be
scrutinizing their actions prior to filing for bankruptcy).
122. See generally Joao F. Magalhaes et al., The Sword and the Shield: More on the
Old Tale of Deepening Insolvency and in Pari Delicto Doctrine, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan.
2012, at 32, 75 (characterizing fraud as “more relevant” determination in the Lemington case).
123. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 294 (examining deepening insolvency framework in post-CitX jurisprudence)
124. See id. (defining fraud for purposes of deepening insolvency).
125. See id. at 285–96 (discussing facts relevant to holding that district court’s
summary judgment order against appellant’s deepening insolvency claims be
vacated).
126. See id. at 294 (“[W]e stated that ‘deepening insolvency’ in Pennsylvania is
defined as ‘an injury to [a debtor’s] corporate property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.’ ”).
127. See id. (maintaining that negligent actions are insufficient to prove deepening insolvency).
128. See id. (reaffirming CitX holding that element of fraud is necessary for a
valid deepening insolvency claim).
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Defining “Fraud” For Purposes of Deepening Insolvency

Although the court in CitX made it clear that fraud needed to be present in order to have a valid deepening insolvency claim, it never explicitly
defined fraud.129 Thus, in Lemington, the court took this extra explanatory
step and defined fraud as “anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a suggestion of what
is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or
silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.”130 This definition is taken
from common law rather than statutes, and essentially holds that fraud is
“any artifice by which a person is deceived to his disadvantage.”131 By clarifying the definition of fraud, the Lemington holding gives practitioners a
better understanding what type of misconduct is necessary to successfully
raise a deepening insolvency claim.
C.

Providing an Example of How a Deepening Insolvency Claim
Can Survive Summary Judgment

Given that summary judgment is a crucial stage in the timeline of
litigation, the Lemington decision is especially important for practitioners
on both sides of the docket.132 Prior to Lemington, the Third Circuit did
not have a precedential case in which a deepening insolvency claim survived summary judgment.133 Even in Lafferty, the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court’s summary judgment ruling against the appellant’s deepening insolvency claim for equitable defense reasons.134 Accordingly,
there are a number of lessons to be learned from Lemington, where the
appellants successively raised a deepening insolvency claim strong enough
to survive summary judgment.
First, any delay after a board has officially decided to file for bankruptcy can be significant.135 In Lemington, the court was highly suspicious
129. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672,
680–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (mentioning fraud as requisite for deepening insolvency
claim, but not elaborating on definition of fraud for purposes of deepening
insolvency).
130. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 294 (quoting In re Reichert’s Estate, 51 A.2d
615, 617 (Pa. 1947)) (stating definition of fraud under Pennsylvania law).
131. Id. (quoting In re Reichert’s Estate, 51 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1947)).
132. See id. at 285 (mentioning procedural posture of case). For a discussion
on how the Lemington holding was noticed by bankruptcy and corporate law practitioners in large law firms, see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
133. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 681 (discussing holding and affirming district
court’s summary judgment dismissal of appellant’s deepening insolvency claims);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 344
(3d Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s summary judgment reversal of appellant’s
deepening insolvency claims).
134. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 344 (holding that appellant’s deepening insolvency claims were properly dismissed). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding in Lafferty, see supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
135. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 293–94 (discussing appellee’s delay in filing for
bankruptcy and implying this to be significant in determination of fraud).
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of the four-month delay between the board’s decision to file bankruptcy
and the actual filing date, and this became sufficient to create an inference of fraud.136 Had the corporation’s board filed for bankruptcy
promptly, their liability would have most likely been limited to breach of
fiduciary duty claims.137
Next, evidence of self-dealing can be used to trigger the adverse interest exception to the in pari delicto defense. In Lafferty, the court affirmed
summary judgment against the appellant’s deepening insolvency claims
because it held that the directors’ fraudulent acts could be imputed to the
corporation, and therefore, in pari delicto applied.138 The board members
for Lemington, however, did not engage in any large scale fraud through
the corporation, but they did transfer the corporation’s assets to other
entities under their control.139 The Lemington court ruled that this type of
fraudulent self-dealing act could not be imputed to the corporation and in
pari delicto did not apply.140
Finally, proving fraud is the key to having a successful deepening insolvency claim. Realistically, as a non-profit corporation that had been
struggling for years, Lemington’s overall value most likely did not significantly diminish because its board decided to prolong the corporation’s life
by four months.141 However, the Third Circuit appeared to overlook actual damages and focused on evidence of fraud.142 For future litigation
involving deepening insolvency, proving or disproving the fraud element
will be crucial.143
136. See id. (addressing facts suggesting questions of fraud being present).
137. See id. (pointing first to delay in bankruptcy filing as evidence of fraud).
Although the court discussed other factors that led it to believe fraud could be
present, most of these factors arose from the board’s failure to file the bankruptcy
promptly. See id. at 294 (“The Committee alleges that fraud ‘is apparent in the
Board’s failure to disclose to the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court the Board’s
decision made in January 2005 to close the Home and deplete the patient census,
while delaying the bankruptcy filing until April 2005 . . . .’ ”).
138. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 360 (“[W]e find that the in pari delicto doctrine
bars the Committee, standing in the shoes of the Debtors, from bringing its claims
against Lafferty.”).
139. See Lemington, 659 F.3d at 288 (noting how Lemington’s board transferred corporate assets to other entities in their control).
140. See id. at 293 (“Because the Committee has tendered sufficient evidence
that the directors’ and officers’ . . . did not benefit the Home but instead benefited
their own self-interest, the applicability of the ‘adverse interest’ exception presents
a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment on this basis is therefore
inappropriate.”).
141. See id. at 285–90 (discussing corporation’s financial struggles starting in
1980s and continuing until its bankruptcy in 2005).
142. See id. at 293–95 (focusing on determining fraud while reviewing appellant’s deepening insolvency claims).
143. See Magalhaes et al., supra note 125, at 75 (characterizing fraud as “more
relevant” determination in the Lemington case).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss4/4

22

Kim: Still Solvent: The Third Circuit Continues to Support "Deepening
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-4\VLR404.txt

unknown

2012]

CASEBRIEF
V.

Seq: 23

5-DEC-12

12:11

761

CONCLUSION

Within a decade, the Third Circuit both catalyzed and corralled the
movement towards validating the tort of deepening insolvency with its decisions in Lafferty and CitX, respectively.144 The addition of the Lemington
holding to the overall jurisprudence shows that the Third Circuit has, yet
again, surprised practitioners in bankruptcy law. Ultimately, deepening
insolvency still appears to be on the decline and only time will tell whether
the decision in Lemington will have the effect of actually reviving support
for the controversial theory.145 However, in Pennsylvania, as long as deepening insolvency continues to be a valid independent cause of action, the
Third Circuit has made at least one thing clear—the much maligned tort
will be enforced.146
144. See Jonathan Friedland, Fiduciary Duties of Insolvent Corporations—Deepening Insolvency, STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR DISTRESSED BUSINESSES § 17:18 (2012)
(discussing how Lafferty holding expanded deepening insolvency and subsequent
CitX decision limited it).
145. See Fawkes, supra note 124 (“While it may be a stretch to read the Third
Circuit’s decision beyond the particular facts and circumstances of the Lemington
Home case—particularly with respect to its holding regarding deepening
insolvency . . . .”).
146. See Magalhaes et al., supra note 125, at 32 (“Contrary to many other parts
of the country, the tort of ‘deepening insolvency’ appears to be alive and well in
Pennsylvania.”).
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